PUNISHMENT, PURPOSE, AND PLACE: A CASE STUDY OF ARIZONA’S PRISON SITING DECISIONS

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ABSTRACT

In this chapter, I trace Arizona’s prison siting and construction history to examine how cultural norms and traditions, economics, political prerogatives, and notions about the prison’s purpose shape how such institutions are conceived, planned, and realized over time. By looking longitudinally at how prisons have come to be – as physical entities – in one locale, I reveal both the continuities and changes in the underlying meaning of the prison. In doing so, I aim to contribute to a broader understanding of the process of late modern penal change, especially the proliferation of prison building in the past 30 years.

INTRODUCTION

In 1876, Arizona opened the Yuma Territorial Prison, which, on the surface, seemed to be part of the last wave of a larger penitentiary-building
movement that had swept across the United States over the prior half-century. Yet the Yuma prison, like many of its western peers, had an underlying ethos that was both tougher and less concerned with the prisoner’s capacity to reform than such institutions in the eastern region of the country. Built in the desert near the Southern Arizona–California border, where summer temperatures sometimes reach 120°F, the Yuma prison has been memorialized in Western films and novels as a place so harsh that no prisoner ever escaped alive. Although it was only open for a total of 33 years, this institution seemed to put into motion a distinct set of norms about the prison’s function and meaning that have shaped Arizona’s punishment practices across its history. Indeed, when the state began its major facilities expansion 110 years after Yuma originally opened, similar notions about what prison life should be like – austere, unpleasant, and as economically self-sufficient as feasible – were articulated by state leaders as they made decisions about the kinds of facilities they aimed to build.

In this chapter, I trace the prison construction history in Arizona to examine how cultural norms and traditions, economics, political prerogatives, and notions about the prison’s purpose shape how such institutions are conceived, planned, and realized over time. I am particularly interested in how that process reflects some of the underlying ideals about prisons and their function in the larger social sphere. Using existing press reports, government records, and other primary and secondary sources, I construct a history that begins in the 1870s, when the Arizona territorial government first got into the prison business, and that culminates in the most recent prison-building boom which was launched more than 100 years later. By looking longitudinally at how prisons have come to be – as physical entities – in one locale, I aim to contribute to a broader understanding of the process of late modern penal change and expansion, about which many scholars have written (see De Giorgi, 2006; Garland, 2001; Gottschalk, 2006; Simon, 2007).

The chapter will proceed as follows: in the next section, I offer a broad stroke review of penal developments in the 19th and 20th centuries at the national level. I follow with six chronologically sequential sections that each addresses a specific thematic period and/or moment of transition in the state’s prison construction history. Each section will detail how state actors articulated their (sometimes competing) vision of the institution’s purpose, including its relationship to both those who are confined within it and the larger community. Within that, I focus on how those articulations shaped decisions about where to site new institutions, and what the physical manifestations should look like.
As has been well documented by many scholars and policy analysts, US incarceration rates began to dramatically increase in the late 1970s, forcing most state correctional systems (and the federal penal system) to come to terms with the outer limits of their institutional capacity. Every state in the nation experienced incarceration increases of a very similar magnitude despite significant jurisdictional and regional differences in political cultures and structures, criminal justice styles, and incarceration rates (Zimring & Hawkins, 1991). States that did not have the kind of welfarist political structure that has allegedly been supplanted by the leaner and meaner neo-liberal form of governance (such as many places in the deep South and much of the non-coastal West) began to amp up their use of incarceration after decades of maintaining relatively stable rates of imprisonment in the 1970s right alongside those states that had exemplified the rehabilitative model.

Up until then, jurisdictions had generally regulated the use of prison, even in times of social and economic insecurity, so that a relatively stable percentage of the general population was incarcerated year by year (Zimring & Hawkins, 1991). Specifically, while prison population numbers grew along with general population growth in states across the United States, the national average incarceration rate vacillated around 100 prisoners per 100,000 citizens from 1929 to the 1970s (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1998). In contrast, between 1974 and 2000, the rate of incarceration grew from 93 per 100,000 to 478 per 1,000,000. Although individual states’ incarceration rates continue to significantly vary from each other, ranging from a low of 128 in Minnesota and a high of 801 in Louisiana by year-end 2000, they all grew by roughly the same multiplier in the late 20th century (Beck & Harrison, 2001; Zimring & Hawkins, 1991). As a result of this dramatic growth in the prison population, states began building new facilities across the nation by the end of the 1970s, with the construction accelerating through the late 1980s and early 1990s at a rate unprecedented in history (Lawrence & Travis, 2004; Myers & Martin, 2004). The majority of the new construction has been in rural areas, with 350 new rural facilities opening in the last 2 decades of the 20th century (King, Mauer, & Huling, 2003).

This, however, was not the first “wave” of prison building in the United States. A century before the contemporary facilities expansion began, most states had just recently completed construction on the first round of state level penal institutions, as they followed the lead of early 19th century New York and Pennsylvania in building their own penitentiaries. As many
sociologists and historians have documented, the first American prison-building movement was generally underpinned by a set of beliefs and justifications about how such an institution would benefit offenders and their larger communities (Rothman, 1971). Very nascent conceptions about the potential for human reform spawned a range of institutions that sought to shape the body and soul of myriad human subjects (Foucault, 1977[1975]; Rose, 1998). Specialized facilities for the developmentally disabled, the mentally ill, and those with physical anomalies and moral shortcomings cropped up at roughly the same time as the penitentiary became a standard state feature, which, in its idealized form, would reshape criminal offenders into productive, morally fit citizens.

In the United States, though, even this earlier penitentiary movement was characterized by fundamental regional variations in terms of how the institution was conceived and justified. Although most of the early prisons were expected to strive for self-sufficiency (Feeley, 2002), Southern and Western penitentiaries, which came into being later than those in the Northeast region, typically exploited prisoner labor in ways to ensure no cost, if not a profit, to the state. In the post–Civil War South, many new institutions developed extensive farming operations that produced valuable crops to market, and simultaneously developed programs of repressive convict leasing to private landowners who could purchase convict labor to replace newly freed slaves. In the West, similar kinds of inmate labor schemes were utilized, albeit with less severity and brutality than the Southern schemes. In these places, the prisoner was mainly there to work for the state’s (and the state’s powerful private citizens) economic benefit, often under brutal conditions; other reformatory efforts were scarcely employed (see Adamson, 1983; Edgerton, 2004; Johnson, 1997; Lichtenstein, 1996; Lynch, 2009; Massey & Myers, 1989). In contrast, Northeastern and Midwestern penitentiaries were more likely to use work as a mode of correction, in conjunction with other practices that were designed to improve the offender as a person. Furthermore, the first penitentiaries in the North and Midwest were frequently located in or near urban centers (i.e., Baltimore, Boston, Philadelphia, Trenton, NJ, and Columbus, OH) whereas Western, and especially Southern penitentiaries were more often sited in rural settings that allowed for large farming industries (Farrigan & Glasmeier, 2002).

The 20th century, into the 1970s, saw a slow but steady pace of institutional construction, primarily in the larger states. Often these new institutions were designed to institute rehabilitative improvements based on the penological expertise that was growing in academic and institutional settings. Thus, California, for instance, built a series of specialized correctional institutions
between 1941 and 1965 that served specific offender subpopulations through programs of vocational training, medical intervention, and psychotherapeutic treatment (Simon, 1993). But by the time that prison admissions began to skyrocket, the rehabilitative ideal that undergirded the penal enterprise in many jurisdictions had fallen out of favor across numerous constituencies, thereby destabilizing the prison’s meaning despite its proliferation (Allen, 1981; Garland, 2001).

Consequently, the contemporary building spree appears to be less tied to an internal logic about the purpose of the prison and its relation to offenders, and prison construction seems to be increasingly justified by external considerations. In many jurisdictions, the new wave of construction has been justified simply as a necessity to meet the dual demands of federal courts that required conditions comply with the Constitution, and state and local courts that sent rapidly increasing numbers of offenders to prison (Lynch, 2009; Schoenfeld, 2008). This has been followed, in a number of jurisdictions, by a trend in which state political actors have explicitly sold prison construction to local, generally rural, civic leaders and citizenry as an economic stimulus opportunity (Gilmore, 2007; Huling, 2002; Myers & Martin, 2004). Thus, the linkage between the criminality of individual offenders and the “account” of the institution’s purpose has become somewhat decoupled, allowing the prison to more explicitly serve purposes outside of its basic custodial and corrective functions.

Indeed, as Ruth Gilmore (2007) demonstrates in her analysis of California’s prison expansion, the unprecedented investment in prisons that began around 1980 in that state is the likely product of a series of social, economic, and political factors that have little to do with crime rates and the problem of criminality, and much more to do with dramatic restructuring of local economies as a product of myriad forces – globalization of capital, the demise of manufacturing in many industries, and shifts and declines in farming and extraction industries. In a broader analysis, Jonathan Simon (2007) has also illustrated how state actors have taken to “governing through crime,” offering the prison as a key “solution,” in response to deeper insecurities and loss of faith in the state’s ability to protect the populace. Thus, the prison is not only rhetorically constructed as a solution to myriad social ills, it is literally offered up by state leaders as the solution to local economic woes (Gilmore, 2007; Huling, 2002; King, Mauer, & Huling, 2004).

Although the fact that the contemporary incarceration explosion occurred in every state over a similar period of time indicates some form of national level process at work; ultimately, rather localized decisions had
to be made in a multitude of jurisdictions to invest in penal institutions at a rate that was unprecedented up to this time. Thus, this case study of a single jurisdiction explores the particulars of that local process: how such building was justified and sold to the public, how decisions were made about each institution’s physical characteristics, including size, features, and location, and how state actors committed to these large scale public investments, particularly as the costs could not be absorbed by the state’s existing revenue streams.

THE ARIZONA CASE STUDY

Overview

Looking longitudinally, Arizona’s pattern of incarceration over time is fairly congruent with the national trends, although its rate has consistently trended higher than national averages. The state maintained an incarceration rate that generally hovered about 8–10% above the national average into the 1970s, and got by with just one adult prison institution throughout that period. After a brief dip below the national average in the early 1970s, however, Arizona’s imprisonment rate began to shoot up rapidly at the end of that decade – outpacing the national average growth – and by 1984, it was among the top 10 of the 50 states in incarceration rate, where it has stayed ever since. In terms of actual numbers, the total adult prison population in Arizona was maintained at or below 2,000 inmates into the early 1970s, but by September 2008, the state imprisoned over 39,000 convicts, housed within 10 prison “complexes” scattered around the state, as well as in 8 contracted facilities, 7 of which are private prisons (2 of those are operated out of state).

The state’s resistance to prison expansion prior to the 1970s had little to do with a commitment to being humane or appropriately “corrective” with wrongdoers. Rather, Arizona’s style of punishment was traditionally harsh and punitive from the start (Lynch, 2009). Rehabilitation had no place in the penal regime until the late 1960s, when it then had a short-lived, fitful existence that was primarily the product of importation via “expert” corrections directors who were appointed from out of state (Lynch, 2009). And even though severe overcrowding was a fact of life for the lone state prison from just about the start, there was little political will or fiscal commitment to dramatically expanding capacity, and no commitment whatsoever in adding new institutions until the 1970s.
Deciding Where Prisons Belong: A History of Politics and Compromise

As noted earlier, the first prison in Arizona was built in the small, isolated desert town of Yuma. The facility itself was located high on a rocky hill, bordered by the Gila and Colorado Rivers as well as by miles of undeveloped desert, so the landscape provided a natural barrier to those who might try to flee. Nonetheless, the prison was fortified by a limestone and adobe perimeter wall that, at its widest, was 8 feet thick and at its tallest nearly 20 feet tall. The prison was built almost exclusively by inmate labor – the 15 prisoners who became its first occupants had lived on the site for several months while constructing the initial cells and administration building (Jeffrey, 1969).

Yuma prison became best known – in folklore at least – for its brutal punitive regime, rather than for any enlightened reformative ideals. Disciplined prisoners were subjected to restraints of the ball and chain, as well as to stints of isolation in the bleak “Snake Den” dungeon, which was a stark, empty hole of a cell that was dug into the ground and covered with solid iron doors designed to keep light and fresh air out of the space. The placement of the Yuma prison – in a desolate and inhumanely hot locale – has been inextricably linked to its penal philosophy in the constructed narrative about this institution. Indeed, in 1896, the New York Times published a long feature about the prison that was particularly taken with the geographical elements of the site, calling it “one of the most remarkable prisons in the United States” from which none of the “desperate characters” who filled it had ever escaped (New York Times, 1896, n.p.).

Yet its siting was actually an accident of oversight, politically speaking. After a brief experiment in nominally converting all of the territory’s local jails into territorial penitentiaries, the government decided to commit to building a new institution that would genuinely function as a territory-wide prison. Several cities competed to have the prison be built in their jurisdiction, and there was fairly broad agreement within the territorial legislature to build it in or near Phoenix. In 1868, a bill authorizing that a prison be built in Phoenix was passed, but it took seven more years for a funding scheme to be approved. A Phoenix legislator introduced a bill to approve a bond issue to raise funds for construction in 1875, however two legislators from Yuma inserted the name, “Yuma” in for “Phoenix” within the body of the bill as it was being voted upon. The bill passed, the governor signed off on the altered bill, and the bonds were quickly sold to raise about $20,000 in construction funds, resulting in the prison being built in Yuma (Jeffrey, 1969; Trazfer & George, 1980).
Like the representatives from Phoenix and Florence (which also competed for the prison), Yuma’s legislators were motivated to secure the prison for economic reasons. Yuma had a population of just several hundred people, and the prison would have a huge impact on the local economy by opening up opportunities for lucrative goods and services contracts (Jeffrey, 1969). Indeed, even the Southern Pacific Railroad had a major stake in having the prison go to Yuma, as the town was right along their line (Los Angeles Times, 1897).

The superintendents at Yuma also appeared to be in sync with trends from penitentiaries in the eastern region of the United States, which had labor as the centerpiece of the penal regime. Their biennial reports generally included a detailed discussion of their efforts to reach full employment among the inmates, which also signaled their perception that territorial leaders considered inmate employment an important goal. But because the land in Yuma was inhospitable to an agricultural industry, prison administrators struggled to come up with other work opportunities to occupy the bulk of the prisoners. Some inmates were assigned to the quarry on site to break rocks, and others worked on construction, maintenance, and adobe brick manufacturing projects within the prison, but the majority of inmates had no work to do.

Unlike the underlying rationale for inmate employment in Eastern penitentiaries, though, the value of work in this case was not primarily driven by its utility as a disciplinary or correctional strategy. Rather, it was articulated as an economic one in that it would help make prisons more self-sufficient and less reliant on tax dollars. For instance, in 1890, Superintendent Ingalls proposed an experimental plan to harvest, process, and sell the naturally growing hemp along the neighboring riverbanks as a “means of making the prison, as far as possible, self-sustaining” (Ingalls, 1890, p. 2) through full inmate employment in a potentially revenue-generating industry. A few years later, Superintendent Gates reported of another “experiment” to get a farming industry off the ground on some donated land from the federal government, suggesting that if it succeeded it too could “prove quite a factor in making the prison self-sustaining” (Gates, 1895, p. 4). Superintendent Gates went on to highlight the importance of striving for self-sufficiency in his biennial report.

It is a most lamentable fact that a large number of prisoners of late and at present confined here have been in nowise instrumental in providing for their support and are therefore totally dependant for maintenance on the citizens of the Territory, this creating a burden in the matter of taxation, which to say the least is very irksome… (Gates, 1895, p. 4)
Yet despite the efforts of prison administrators, the goal of full inmate employment and a self-sustaining institution were never realized at Yuma, which was a major part of the impetus in the drive to move the prison to a new location.

Replacing Yuma

The territorial prison was replaced by a new facility in 1908, which was built by a subset of Yuma prisoners in Florence, a small town located about 200 miles east of Yuma and 75 or so miles either way to Phoenix and Tucson. Several factors prompted the decision to change locales. The debates centered on Yuma’s geographic isolation, which contributed to the high expense of maintaining the prison there, and – equally importantly – the limited employment opportunities available to inmates. Catalyzing the realization of a new prison was the geographical limitation of the existing institution on top of a rocky hill, in that there was no way to expand the facilities to sufficiently keep up with a growing penal population, nor was there space to add manufacturing facilities to keep the growing population employed. By 1889, the inmate population had grown to over 134, whereas the facility opened just over a decade earlier equipped for 34 inmates (Ingalls, 1890). By 1904, the population had more than doubled again, to 294. At that point, the prison’s single cells housed 6 inmates, the double cells held 12, trusty prisoners slept outside on cots, and an iron prefabricated “cage” had been purchased and installed to house additional inmates (Griffith, 1904). Before the move actually happened, the Yuma prison population had expanded to over 400 inmates, and there was absolutely no room to add more. Thus, a new institution had to be built somewhere, which opened up the possibility of a change in locale.

The effort to move the prison began in 1887, but was not realized for another two decades. During this period, political and press commentators throughout the rest of the territory raised issues about the economic drain to the taxpayers that resulted from having the prison located in a remote area, and legislators made it clear that the new site would need to offer opportunities for full inmate employment (Arizona Daily Star, 1907). Once again, political leaders from several locales vied for the new prison; this time, the towns of Florence, Prescott, and Benson all competed for the prison, whereas Yuma leaders fought to keep the institution in their town, as it accounted for about $50,000 a year in revenue (Los Angeles Times, 1899b, February 18).
Prescott was a persistent suitor: its legislators sponsored bills to remove the prison to their town on an annual basis beginning in 1895. Senator Norton, from Prescott, was a major backer of this effort, arguing for the move on the grounds that it would allow prisoners to “earn their keeping” (Los Angeles Times, 1897, p. 2) and would return thousands of dollars of contracts for prison supplies to Arizona from California, which had been the practice at Yuma. By 1899, Prescott offered to donate the land for the new prison, plus cover most of the construction costs (Los Angeles Times, 1899a, February 10), but ultimately failed to woo the majority of the legislature.

Florence ultimately won the prison siting battle when it donated 160 acres of city owned land to the territory for the prison to be built. Florence also had support from influential Phoenix legislators, which helped close the deal in terms of votes. The site was lauded for the low maintenance costs that would come with it, as well as the opportunities for utilizing inmate labor for state benefit (Los Angeles Times, 1908). Since Florence had the climate and agricultural conditions conducive to farming, it was an ideal site that would allow for the kind of self-sufficiency that governmental actors sought for the prison institution. Consequently, as planned, the new prison developed a major farming component, eventually on 820 acres that surrounded the prison facility. Although the prison also developed a labor regime that had its inmates building new roads, bridges, and highways once Arizona reached statehood in 1912, farming was the Florence prison’s primary industry and work program.

Although its productivity varied greatly over the years – depending on the leadership of the prison – the farm industry was viewed as vital to the facility’s self-sufficiency, and therefore central to its effectiveness as an institution. For example, in a 1938 state audit of the prison, the field auditor, Clyde Cropper, bemoaned the incompetent and inefficient use of the acreage, detailing how it could be better utilized to grow sufficient crops to feed all the inmates and staff. He suggested that, “this is one reason why the account for foodstuffs is excessive,” and why expenses were “all out of proportion” (Cropper, 1938, pp. 10–11). In his assessment, this was one key component of an overall profligate and sloppy fiscal operation that needed major reform.

More fundamentally, the farm operations were key to the institution’s meaning all the way into the 1970s, especially from the mid-1950s through the early 1970s under Superintendent Frank Eyman, who both wholeheartedly believed that work was key to prison order and discipline, and who boasted of the added value offered by the cost savings that were generated for the state due to the extensive and varied farm production (Eyman, 1958, 1960, 1962; Lynch, 2009). The farm, under Eyman’s
leadership, produced all of the meat, eggs, dairy products, grains, fruits, and vegetables for inmate meals; grew and milled the wheat to make baked goods; and grew, processed and wove the cotton for all of the inmate uniforms. The farm even turned a profit (on paper) in that the canned and packaged excess foodstuffs were sold to other state agencies and institutions (Eyman, 1958, 1960). The placement of the prison at Florence, then, was ultimately a success on several fronts, since it allowed for a self-contained agricultural labor program that would fulfill multiple institutional goals.

The Prison as a Place on the Continuum of Community: The Late 1960s–Early 1980s

The next time that there was any serious consideration about building and siting a new prison was in the late 1960s after a formal department of corrections was established in the state. By this time, though, the definition of a successful prison had changed dramatically for penal administrators, the executive branch, and even the majority of the legislature. Indeed, the rural, all-purpose prison was considered an antiquated and ineffective model, if for no other reason than its location, and new institutions should ideally strive for inmate reform and reintegration back into the community. Nonetheless, the goal of cost-effectiveness still played at least a rhetorical role in trying to sell prison construction to urban communities that fought against having facilities sited in their vicinity.

The first director of the newly formed Arizona Department of Corrections, Alan Cook, introduced his vision for new state institutions very early on in his tenure. Cook had come to the state after retiring from the California Department of Corrections, which was then a highly innovative system in terms of its rehabilitative regimes, and his goal was to modernize Arizona’s penal practices in line with contemporary correctional ideals. Thus, he proposed building “revolutionary” new facilities that would render the antiquated prison at Florence obsolete. Key to his plan was building smaller, specialized facilities that would serve the diverse needs of the prison population, primarily within urban settings. Despite a very stingy legislature, he was able to make some small-scale additions to the penal system that converged with this larger vision. He opened the state’s first halfway houses in both Phoenix and Tucson, and he oversaw the building of a modern juvenile boys’ facility in Tucson (the existing industrial school was in a very rural ranching area, approximately 4 h from Phoenix) and a girls’ school in
outer Phoenix, replacing the state contracted patchwork of placements that had served girls.

But his dream project was a planned “training facility” for 18–25 year old young men offenders, which was to be built in Phoenix. After receiving a $35,000 appropriation from the legislature in 1970 to begin planning on the project, Cook applied for and received an additional $100,000 from the federal government to pay for plans and design. This facility was going to be the first of its kind and would realize all of the modern correctional goals that Cook had planned for the state. It would be situated within an urban setting from which the majority of prisoners came, and was to include residential and work furlough treatment programs, vocational and educational training, diagnostic services for the courts, and services for probation violators and parole recidivists. It would also be specialized, in that it would serve a specific subset of inmates and directly address their correctional needs.

As a Department spokesman told a reporter in 1971, “Arizona is going to try to establish a new pattern of correctional institutions with this facility by departing from any past traditional type [institutions] ... and will try to create the concept of normal community life” (Phoenix Gazette, 1971). The institution would be classified as a “medium security” facility, with a 100 person diagnostic center as the starting point, and 10 small but secure housing units that would each accommodate 30 inmates in single rooms, with extensive facility space for treatment programs offering individual and group therapy, an educational program, and vocational programs. Outside of the secured facility would be three housing units designed for 90 residents, to accommodate those who “graduated” to work furlough/training furlough in preparation for release.

Just as Cook was about to retire in early 1973, the legislature agreed to support two such facilities and provided immediate funding for the first to be built in Phoenix, and also promising future support for the second to be built in Tucson. The institutions would be smaller than the original plan, each serving between 250 and 300 young offenders, but the net effect would be that a significant portion of the adult male penal population – around one third of the approximately 1,500 prisoners at Florence in early 1973 – could potentially end up in the new facilities.

The key to these institutions was their placement in the state’s population centers, which would provide myriad therapeutic benefits for the inmate that directly linked to the entire purpose of the institution itself. The location allowed for experts and specialists who would already be based in the cities to be utilized for treatment. The urban placement would also allow the institution to exploit the college communities – Arizona State University,
near Phoenix and University of Arizona in Tucson – for additional expertise and volunteer help. Most importantly, the facilities would be based within the offenders’ own communities to help maintain family bonds, which was seen by the correctional administration as crucial to the rehabilitative process, and which would allow for the graduated release process and the integration of corrections within the community.

In conceptualizing this institution, the Department of Corrections administrators purposefully linked the placement of the facility, the architectural design, and the planned activities to take place within its walls to both the offenders’ needs and the larger community’s needs. A Department of Corrections official who made a presentation to state leaders and community members during the design period made this explicit to his audience: “It cannot be overemphasized that the proposed design followed the defining of the program, and, therefore, all design is oriented to the needs and requirements of the target population, as well as those of society at large” (Arizona Correctional Training Facility presentation, 1971, p. 2). The presenter suggested that the day of “the remote, out-of-sight, out-of-mind institution is ... over” and that the ability to successfully implement the proposed program was “literally built in to the site location” (Arizona Correctional Training Facility presentation, 1971, p. 3).

As the facility moved into the concrete planning stage, the linkages between the design of the institution and its broader penological goals were more specifically made clear. In the 1973 Preliminary Plan of the Arizona Correctional Training Facility, the superintendent of the planned institution asserted that because “traditional prison design mitigates against treatment goals,” this facility was designed to be “as non-institutional as possible, [to] create an atmosphere of openness” (Geddis, 1973, p. 9). The institution was thus planned in an open campus style, and utilized high security unbreakable, bullet-proof glass windows rather than metal bars to “maintain a non-punitive and rehabilitation-oriented environment” (Schwartz, 1975, p. A1).

It took until 1978, after a series of major political battles, for even the first of these institutions to be realized. In the early years of the process, the concept of the urban institution was widely supported by the corrections department, the majority of the legislature, and the governor, but the political support became diluted as the planning moved toward becoming a reality. Over an 18-month period in 1973 and 1974, there were crippling community protests against every proposed site in or near Phoenix, and five different viable locations in the metropolitan area ended up getting rejected as a result. Legislative representatives from each district where the new prison was being proposed used all their power to sway their colleagues
against forcing the prison on the affected communities. The representatives did not object to the concept of building a prison in an urban setting, they just did not want it in their districts where their protesting constituents lived. Because both houses of the state legislature were majority Republican and the representatives from the affected communities tended also to be Republicans, they were able to convince their colleagues to drop the given site. In the end, the legislature gave up and moved the first facility to Tucson, where the mainly Democratic representatives had less political sway with their peers.

There were several significant aspects to this prison siting battle. First, the idea that the prison would serve as an economic booster was raised here in a way that both echoed the past and foreshadowed the future. Several proponents of the urban prison attempted to quell residents’ objections by suggesting that their local community and its businesses would greatly benefit from the prison, through contracts for goods and services, and as a result of corrections’ employees spending money in the locale. An Arizona Republic headline, “Proposed prison called a gold mine” (Swanson, 1974) exemplified this pitch to the community, and the attached article detailed the ways in which it would financially benefit Phoenix, according to a visiting “corrections expert.”

In addition, two rural communities actively sought the new prison, much in the manner that had been the case with the Yuma and Florence prisons many years earlier. Florence was one of the towns that sought the new prison, as it would continue to do as the impending prison-building spree commenced. Florence’s economy was substantially built around the existing state prison, and city leaders realized the fiscal benefits associated with its presence. However, Florence’s non-urban location doomed it in the eyes of the majority of the stakeholders.

Similarly, the town of Gila Bend, which was about an hour and a half from Phoenix, wanted the prison “desperately,” as a newspaper editorial put it at the time, because the economy had suffered ever since a major highway was built that bypassed the town (Arizona Republic, 1974, n.p). Town leaders offered the state a large plot of land for $2.50 an acre, and offered to supply the required water as well, if the state would locate the prison in Gila Bend. These local leaders explicitly framed their desire for the prison solely on economic grounds. Their pleas, coupled with the incentives offered to the state, convinced some lawmakers to abandon their commitment to an urban facility. This was the first fracture in the long-term plan to update the state’s penal system through the use of specialized, locale-sensitive facilities. The local news media joined in, with the state’s
major paper, the Arizona Republic, demanding in an editorial that the state quit “dawdling” and put the prison in Gila Bend (Arizona Republic, 1974). Nonetheless, during this entire period, the discourse about the prison was generally maintained at the level of the institution as a holistic entity. Institutional actors, political actors, and others did not speak of the proposed facility in terms of its individual level capacity (i.e., “bed space”) – which would come later – nor as a generic unit among a large network of prisons within which a share of the prison population could be diverted (which would also come later). Rather, the training facility was largely conceptualized, planned, and debated in terms of its overall goals and ideals – who specifically it was designed to serve, how it would serve that population, and how it would fit within the larger community. Even during the turmoil over where the first prison would be sited, the legislators from the affected areas acknowledged the importance of the urban setting for rehabilitation and reintegration goals (Bolles, 1974). This would begin to change by the time it became a reality.

The Transition from Institutions to “Beds”

When the new prison came on line in Tucson, the facility had been significantly transformed from the time of its inception by Alan Cook in 1969 to its concrete realization nearly a decade later. Its name – the Arizona Correctional Training Facility – was the strongest representation of its original vision; in practice, it was another place, outside of the Florence main cellblocks, to divert prisoners in the state’s effort to comply with a standing court order to reduce the population at the main prison. Indeed, by its opening in 1978, discussions about the training facility focused primarily on the “bed space” it offered as a relief to the overcrowding in the Arizona State Prison at Florence.

This metamorphosis symbolically reflects a change in priorities over that period, and is indicative of the movement toward a mass incarceration state. Even though Ellis MacDougall, the corrections director who was in place at the time this institution opened, was deeply committed to the rehabilitative ideal, forces at work within the state had morphed what was to be a “revolutionary” institution into mere additional housing for the growing influx of inmates being sent to the department. And while it was, in its early years, used only for young adults who were 25 or younger and for juveniles convicted as adults, over a matter of just a few years, it offered little to differentiate it from any other medium security facility.
Nonetheless, there remained a strong ideological commitment by the Department of Corrections and the governor to the concept of siting institutions in urban settings. And in 1978, with the pressures of severe prison overcrowding that were not alleviated by the Tucson facility, there was political will to build the second planned urban institution, this time in Phoenix, no matter what the objections were from the public or their legislative representatives. This second facility, however, would not be conceptualized as either revolutionary or innovative as had the first—it merely needed to provide bed space for the burgeoning prison population. The goal in building it was to maximize capacity as much as possible in light of the political obstacles it would face in the Phoenix area.

Because both the Democratic governor, Bruce Babbitt, and the corrections director, Ellis MacDougall, were major political actors who were committed to building the facility in the vicinity of Phoenix, this time around the state withstood intense public opposition and imposed the prison on a community that absolutely did not want it. As was the case during the earlier attempt to locate a prison in Phoenix, there were massive protests every time a site was proposed in the metropolitan area, and again there was strong pressure from the legislators representing the potential site communities not to build in the respective locations. After much political wrangling, and over the objections of the legislators from the area, the governor’s site selection advisory committee settled on a site near west Phoenix, in Litchfield Park.

Community members from Litchfield Park sued the state to keep the prison out, but the department forged ahead during the litigation, and took bids for the construction of a 1,200 bed prison (1,000 men and 200 women) at the site. In the summer of 1979, a Maricopa County judge dismissed both pending lawsuits that challenged the prison. Plaintiffs in one of the cases appealed, and despite a minor victory in the state Court of Appeals and state Supreme Court, the department proceeded on the construction of what was named the Arizona Correctional Center, Perryville. The housing units for men opened in 1981 and the women’s unit was opened a year later.4

At the start of this process, the majority legislators were not opposed to siting the prison in the Phoenix area, but as the stand-off between the governor’s office and the community became more heated, the Republican dominated legislature abandoned its commitment to urban institutions. In the months following the selection of the Litchfield Park site, the legislature passed a bill that required the state to build the new prison in Florence where the old maximum security prison still operated. In the spring of 1979, Governor Babbitt vetoed that legislation, reasserting his commitment to the Litchfield Park site. By 1980, the siting issue had become nearly completely
polarized on party lines. The chairman of the state Republican Party issued a long news release that castigated Babbitt for his arrogance in prioritizing “the technical requirements of penologists against the most fundamental rights of the people of Litchfield Park to safety and security of life and property” (Pappas, 1980, p. 2). The press release’s message captured the essence of what would become a mainstay of criminal justice policy making here, as well as in many jurisdictions: That offenders were in a zero-sum game with victims and potential victims, and political figures ought to choose the right side to survive.

Almost concurrent to the planning of the Perryville prison, the department incurred more community wrath by buying a motel in central Phoenix, which was to be converted into a women’s prison for use until the Perryville women’s unit came on line. As was the case with the two urban training facilities, the site selection for this facility was constructed as important for penological reasons, particularly for the seamlessness with which the community and the correctional population could interact. The Director of the Department of Corrections, Ellis MacDougall, suggested that the location was beneficial because it “not only allows some of the women to go outside the institution but brings the community into the institution” (MacDougall, 1980, p. 34). This project was also challenged and went to court, and again the state played hardball by forging ahead with the renovations while simultaneously fighting the lawsuit. Ultimately, after an extensive hearing in front of a Maricopa County judge, the state prevailed and opened the converted motel as the Arizona Center for Women in 1979, which continues to house women prisoners despite its original designation as a temporary prison.

In both of these cases, there was sufficient elite political will (at least in the executive branch), and a commitment to an ideology about prison’s broader purpose that necessitated its placement in an urban setting, to overcome all kinds of resistance. At this point, the design of the institutions themselves was less strategically important than it had been in the conceptualization of the first urban facility, but locating facilities within an urban setting was still considered vital, at least by some state actors, especially to secure professional staff. Thus, Governor Babbitt and the corrections department fought off significant pressure to move the second “training” institution to Florence, which had lobbied for it (as did many legislators). They also withstood the significant challenges from Phoenix municipal and business leaders to locate a 160-bed women’s facility right in the city.

Clearly, though, the ideals underlying the original conceptualization of the training facilities had been eroded by the time that the Perryville
Institution was even in the planning stage, and the signifiers of the mass incarceration state were emerging. In 1973, when the legislature first authorized the training facilities, the plans were for smaller, specialized institutions. The Tucson facility lived up to that design feature in that when it opened, it served 380 youthful adult medium security inmates. Perryville, however, was designed from its inception to be over three times larger, and to serve a whole range of inmates, from minimum to medium security for men and from minimum to maximum security for women, of any age and criminal background. So while the Department of Corrections had declared in 1971 that “the day of the large, catch-all institution is over” (Arizona Correctional Training Facility presentation, 1971, p. 3), by 1978 that obsolete form of institution was back.

Furthermore, in the planning years for the Tucson facility, the bed space capacity was rarely mentioned in news stories, and when it was, it was generally noted as a feature of the new kind of smaller, specialized facility that was being designed. In contrast, discourse about the Perryville institution, by political actors as well as by corrections officials, consistently referenced its value in providing desperately needed bed space during the planning years, especially as the department faced court orders to relieve overcrowding in the existing prisons (Lynch, 2009). News stories regularly referred to it as the “1,200-bed” prison, thus highlighting its value in increasing system capacity.

The Move to Warehousing: From the Training Center to the Prison City

Ironically, the first glimmer of the kind of warehousing model that is said to characterize contemporary prisons (Robertson, 1997) came almost simultaneously to the planning and development of the training facility in Tucson. In 1975, the governor of New Mexico, Jerry Apodaca, wrote to Arizona Governor Raul Castro asking if Arizona would consider exploring the possibility of a regional prison for special “problem offender” groups (Apodaca letter to Castro, 7-15-1975, Castro’s papers). The original proposal was to investigate the feasibility of building a maximum security prison that would serve offenders from Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah. This proposal was framed in the kind of “risk management” language that Feeley and Simon (1992) have identified as emerging in the penal field in the late modern period.

The regional prison proposal culminated in a planning “conference” 1978, and by this time Nevada had been added to the group of interested
states. The purpose of the proposed facility was solidified at the conference as a way for the participating states to, “remove the hard-core incorrigible prisoners from the state facilities and put them in a maximum-security prison” (Report to the Governor on Regional Prison Conference, 1978). Arizona’s delegates to the regional prison committee felt that the idea was worth pursuing because it would provide relief for the severe prison overcrowding Arizona was experiencing, it would allow for the removal of incorrigibles to aid in overall inmate control, and it would be less expensive than building such an institution at the single state level.

In a 1978 State of Arizona position paper on the regional prison, the proposed facility was referred to as a “super-maximum security” prison, foreshadowing state level developments to come (Richards position paper, 1978). Ultimately, while this regional facility was never built, the idea underlying it – for a “super-maximum” level unit in which to place the system’s most problematic inmates – became a reality in Arizona just two years later with the building of CB-6, a 200-bed high-security unit that opened at Florence in 1980 (see Lynch, 2009 for more on this unit’s history). This was followed, seven years later with the opening of the first of the new generation supermax prisons in the country, also at Florence.

More generally, after the drawn out fight to get the Perryville prison built in Litchfield Park, the will in the executive branch to fight opposition to urban prisons disappeared. This was the product of several factors. First, as in other states, there was a hardening of “law and order” politics within the legislature, which prompted a number of law changes that dramatically increased sentence lengths, beginning with a major criminal code change in 1978. This added enormous pressure on the state to add prison beds to the system as quickly and inexpensively as possible. The stepped up “tough on crime” rhetoric in the state also contained a central strand that heralded making the prison experience as unpleasant as possible, and that fully discounted the value of offender rehabilitation and reintegration. Second, leadership changes, first in the corrections department and eventually in the governor’s office, eroded the unified commitment to urban prisons.

Even before this turnover, the demands on the existing system, which was under court order to reduce overcrowding and improve inmate living conditions in the Florence main prison, necessitated that Governor Babbitt and Director MacDougall add beds wherever they could. As a result, with several prison sites now established in the state, a new strategy for prison expansion – what I call a “dispersed concentration” model of siting new housing units and complete institutions – began to prevail. This happened somewhat haphazardly in the early years, as corrections officials scrambled
to create space for beds within the existing facilities, but eventually became formalized as policy.

For instance, in 1982, a new warehouse built for the prison industries program at Florence was immediately converted into an inmate warehouse—100 “residents” were housed in the sweltering warehouse for most of the year since there was no more space for them in more conventional housing throughout the system. In addition, “tent cities” were erected in early 1982 to house inmates on the grounds of the Tucson prison and at a rural minimum security facility. In the same year, Senator Barry Goldwater acquired 136 Quonset huts from the United States military that had been in storage for over 30 years in Georgia. They were allocated to the Department of Corrections as “do it yourself” prisons, and were transported by train to Florence, where inmates reconstructed them as housing units. They were derogatorily named the “tin cans” by the inmates assigned to take residence in them (Ariav, 1982); however, they continue to be used for housing today. And throughout the system, available recreational spaces, such as lounges, TV rooms, and gyms were converted into makeshift dormitories for the overflow population.

The “dispersed concentration” policy became more formally institutionalized under new corrections director Sam Lewis in 1985, when he regrouped and renamed the existing institutions into “prison complexes.” In a clear move to eschew rehabilitation as a goal of the state’s prisons, he abandoned the use of any “correctional” terminology in referencing state penal institutions, and instead opted for the use of “prison” to refer to all the facilities (Directions, 1985). This was followed by a huge prison-building campaign that began in 1986, during which new complexes were added to the system and most existing “complexes” more than doubled in size.

During this period, where there was a foothold, new housing units were added to the complexes, either on existing property or on acquired land in the vicinity of the existing facilities, which dramatically changed the character of the original institutions. Tucson went from the 380 person capacity that it opened with in 1978 to adding 1,000 new construction beds in the 1986–1987 prison expansion campaign; currently, the Tucson “complex” houses over 3,900 inmates at all security levels (ADC Daily Count, 9-16-2008). Florence grew by leaps and bounds in the 1980s, and eventually split into two adjacent prison complexes when the Eyman complex, which includes two supermax prisons, was formally established in 1991. Today, over 8,800 state inmates are in the Florence and Eyman complexes, and about 1,700 more Arizona prisoners are in several private prisons that have been built in the town (ADC Daily Count, 9-16-2008).
And despite a settlement made with the residents in Litchfield Park that capacity at the Perryville prison would be capped at 1,400 inmates, the state continued to add bed space to that facility, breaking its promise along the way. In the early 1990s, with authorization from the legislature, the department went to double-celling within the existing housing units at Perryville, and added tent housing on the grounds as the system experienced crisis overcrowding. Currently, the Perryville complex has bed space, which is filled to capacity, for over 3,700 prisoners (ADC Daily Count, 9-16-2008).

In addition, between 1983 and 1999, four more brand new prison complex sites (not including the Eyman complex described earlier) opened to complement the five that already existed. As will be discussed in detail later, these sites were selected largely on grounds that were external to traditional penological goals directed at the offender. In particular, they served as a kind of gift to struggling communities to stimulate local economies. Furthermore, the new complexes’ design had become completely divorced from any penological rationale; rather efficiency concerns – construction costs, quick capacity expansion promises, and so on – fully guided the planning and design of the institutions themselves.

Coinciding with the dispersed concentration model was the closing of the urban re-entry facilities, which was justified by the Department of Corrections on economic grounds. By the mid-1990s, most of the state’s urban release centers and halfway houses had been closed; just one facility for women, located in Tucson, remained in operation. Instead, the priority for the department of corrections, the governor, and the legislature was capacity building, exclusively conceived in terms of adding prison beds to the system as quickly and cheaply as feasible. Thus, at this point, penal institutions were no longer framed as living, holistic social spaces, and the discursive unit of analysis had become the “prison bed” in political and institutional communications about proposed expansion.

Within the political arena, this shift in the purpose of prisons was quite congruent with the prevailing message about crime and punishment. Republican legislators framed the policies that allowed for double-bunking and the addition of crowded, substandard housing within previously designated programming areas (such as gyms and industries warehouses) as a way to get rid of the “country club” lifestyle that had allegedly prevailed in the system (Nilsson, February 9, 1983, p. B-4). In addition, legislators in the state passed legislation that would deliberately ensure that the prison experience was neither beneficial nor comfortable for the inmates, while reducing costs to the state. For instance, in 1983, the legislature passed a bill mandating that all prisoners do 40 h a week of “hard labor,”
and in the following year mandated that all new prison construction be completed “predominantly through the employment of inmate labor” (Ricketts, n.d., p. 4).

**Prisons as Economic Stimuli:**
 _Lobbying for Lock-Ups_

Prison siting and construction decisions became completely decoupled from internal institutional purposes once the state began doling out prisons to lobbying communities on economic development grounds in the 1980s. Although this phenomenon was reminiscent of Arizona’s earliest prison-building experiences, this time around, there was little balancing or weighing of the various, divergent interests and needs of the prison inmate population, staff and administration, and community members. Instead, the siting became a political plum that was awarded to the locale that either offered the most for it, or needed it the most for economic survival. Indeed, a legislative mandate to consider economic benefit of siting for distressed, mainly rural communities was established in 1993, thus formalizing the economic consideration as the primary one in prison siting decisions. With this approach, the state has been able to create dispersed new sites in which to continue to concentrate the state’s prison population. Consequently, small rural communities such as Douglas, in southern Arizona and Winslow in the north, became sites for prison expansion – each earning its own prison “complex” in the 1980s – despite their relative isolation and distance from the state’s population centers.

The town of Florence has been the master in maximally benefiting from this. It has proactively lobbied the state for all the planned prisons since the turn of the 20th century, and by the late 1980s, it became the go-to locale for siting new facilities. Its success is best exemplified by Governor Rose Mofford’s 1989 “Prison City” initiative, which aimed to make Florence the “prison city” of the state. Mofford convened a task force that would work with Florence to increase housing and other infrastructure in the town so that the state could continue building prisons in the area. The state, for its part of the partnership, offered resources to the city to encourage prison employees – the bulk of whom commuted from other areas – to live in Florence, including aid to the local schools, mortgage incentives, and property and income tax breaks. The goal of the “prison city” initiative was to add 6,000 prison beds in Florence over a decade and a half, and provide housing for the bulk of the staff needed for that expansion (Polsgrove, 1989).
Florence was an enthusiastic partner, and actively sought the additional beds that were promised by the state. By this point, Florence had figured out how to optimize the financial rewards of being a home to prisons in several ways. First and foremost, Florence realized the economic benefits of having an incarcerated subpopulation that garners per capita revenues with little cost to the city. Prison population growth meant that the town could gain numbers without having to pay for most of the basic services for that population, since they were confined to state custody. Thus, in 1982, the city annexed the land on which the original prison was built, which immediately increased the town population by about two thirds. In anticipation of continued prison building, the town twice more annexed unincorporated land that abutted city limits to then sell to the state for new penal facilities.

As a result, the physical size of the town grew from approximately 10 to 50 square miles over less than 2 decades (Town of Florence homepage). The official city population has grown from 3,391 in 1980, before the first annexation, to 17,781 in 2007 (Decennial Census Population of Arizona, Counties, Cities, & Places: 1860–2000, n.d.; U.S. Census Bureau, 2008). Nearly three quarters of the current population is incarcerated, which is the highest percentage in the nation for towns with populations above 10,000 (Kulish, 2001). Yet the town has little fiscal responsibility to the vast majority of its residents – it only needs to provide sewer lines and back-up fire and police services to the prisons. Conversely, the majority of the town’s residents have no say in local governance since, as prisoners, they cannot vote. In 2001, Florence’s per capita revenue for inmates alone was approximately $4 million (Whiteside, 2002).

Around the time of the “prison city” initiative, the city also instituted a 2.5% construction tax, which they charged to the state when it expanded facilities, and which provided an immediate boost to the city coffers. Finally, the city benefited during the initial expansion phase by getting state subsidies to develop infrastructure, which was provided to attract staff to live in the area. Thus, while the town’s annual budget was significantly subsidized by an ongoing revenue stream based on per capita state and federal funding for the prisoner “residents,” it also managed to get the state, at several points, to come up with large lump sum payments in the form of construction taxes and development funds. All three of these benefits were beyond the scope of the traditional promised economic benefits that prisons purportedly would bring to a community, such as expanded job opportunities, contracts with local vendors and service providers, and added retail commerce from the influx of staff. The aggressive tactics of Florence have garnered national headlines in Harper’s magazine (Whiteside,
2002) and the \textit{Wall Street Journal} (Kulish, 2001), both of which featured Florence in stories about this kind of new prison town.

Florence, though, eventually fell out of favor as the go-to prison site, as other communities clamored for their own prison with fewer or no strings attached. Once the locale of the prison became an obsolete concern (on programmatic and staffing grounds), the state had the liberty to site the prison in any locale that asked for it. Florence nonetheless has continued to be the “prison city” of Arizona. The town actively marketed itself to private prison vendors who not only paid the construction tax, but also imported new residents from out of state. In addition to being home to the two large state prison complexes, Florence now has 4 private prison facilities and a private immigration detention center that collectively hold approximately 5,000 prisoners from Arizona, Alaska, California, Hawaii, Washington state, and the federal government.

The next wave of Arizona prison towns built on Florence’s successes, particularly in terms of annexing land into city limits to benefit from the captive population growth. The town of Buckeye, which actively sought a prison in the 1990s, was awarded the state’s single largest prison, and one of the largest in the country – the 4,150 inmate Lewis State Prison Complex facility – which opened in 1998. From 1997 to 1999, the city sought to annex the land on which the prison was being built, even though the prison site was 15 miles outside of town. In 1998, the legislature passed a law tailored for this situation, in that it authorized such annexation as long as the land to be annexed was within 15 miles of the town’s borders, thus ensuring Buckeye’s success in this effort. As a result, the town was able to nearly double in size in time for the 2000 census, which has meant approximately $1.3 million in additional revenue for the town each year (DeFalco, 1999). The Lewis prison has since grown, and as of September 2008, houses 5,263 inmates, thereby increasing Buckeye’s revenue stream even more. Following Florence’s lead, Buckeye leaders also instituted a construction tax that they tried to collect from the state – totaling $2.8 million for the original Lewis prison construction (which was more than the town’s entire annual budget), but were denied the bulk of it since the annexation was not granted until late 1999.

The planning and construction of the Lewis prison further reflects the now complete disconnect between what might be the social and human purposes of a penal institution and its current goals. In other words, this prison was represented by corrections officials and political leaders as, at least implicitly, a mammoth human storehouse that was successful exclusively because of its efficiency features. The description of its design, offered by the Arizona Department of Corrections, is telling on this issue.
The State of Arizona is putting construction technology, safety and security designs to practical use in a massive prison construction project known as the Arizona State Prison Complex-Lewis. Based on numerous comments by corrections officials from around the country who have toured the facility, the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) has been described as a leader in the field of prison construction. Other states are interested in learning how ADC builds at such a reduced cost rate. According to (then) Corrections Director Terry L. Stewart, the reason for its prison construction success is attributable to the continuing use of a prototypical concept...

Other savings ideas included the careful selection of geographical location to maximize cost efficiency and enhance safety considerations. Construction design included consolidating all prison units into a smaller land area, thereby reducing the need for additional utilities, site lighting, and roads. All units are housed under one complex operation, but maintain the autonomy to respond to unit alarms.

The Arizona State Prison Complex – Lewis is one of the largest single correctional facility construction endeavors in the United States. The behemoth of prison, costing $157 million, includes two 800-bed level 3 male units, two 800-bed level 4 male units, one 600-bed female unit, and one 350-bed maximum security minors unit, with a total inmate population of 4,150, making ASPC-Lewis larger than over 30,000 towns across the United States. The complex contains 294 acres inside the perimeter patrol road. This acreage supports 23 miles of road, 22 miles of fence, 44 acres of agriculture fields and six 24-acre stand alone prison facilities. (Arizona Department of Corrections website)

The account continues on to describe how many gallons of raw sewage would be processed at the prison daily, how many meals would be cooked and pounds of laundry cleaned, and provides details about its advanced security and communications systems. No discussion is offered in this description of what life will be like inside the prison for its 4,150 residents, in that there is no mention of programs, work or educational opportunities, other than to mention the cost savings generated by using inmate labor for construction and farming projects. Furthermore, the geographic siting was based exclusively on efficiency and security goals, rather than on the connection of the prison’s users – both inmates and staff – to the larger community, as had been a major consideration just two decades earlier. Rather, the overall message offered in this account of the Lewis prison complex highlights the efficiency benefits of building a “behemoth” institution that uses a generic design template to reduce design and construction costs, and that could be located anywhere with sufficient open land to allow for its construction. The institution itself merely needs to contain those bodies assigned to it on completion, and the prisoner as agent/subject is no longer a consideration in the design or placement.

A consequence of this current logic of prison siting is that prisoners, if anything, have been reduced to units of cost, rather than as live entities to be
corrected or acted on in any deliberative strategy. This shift has allowed for a final phenomenon of interest in the Arizona case (although clearly not limited to this case). That is, the state now treats prisoners as, in some sense, transferable expenses whose costs can and should be reduced through whatever modes available to the state. This has been realized in several ways. First, as is illustrated by the Lewis prison construction described earlier, new construction projects are designed primarily with economics in mind, both in terms of the costs to build new bed space, and in terms of long-term operational expenses. Security also weighs into the design formula, but programming has completely fallen out of the equation. This almost ensures that, even if there was a will to create institutions that were designed for the well-being and development of their residents, the physical manifestation of the institution – from the siting in rural settings, generally miles from residential areas, to the actual creation of space within the fences of the new institutions – will be at odds with that interest.

Second, Arizona, like a number of other states, has taken to using private or contracted bed space to deal with various subgroups of their prison population. Arizona Department of Corrections first began “outsourcing” inmates in 1994 after a bill authorizing the use of private prisons passed the legislature. The department now contracts with 5 private prisons that have been built in state, a rural in-state county jail, and 2 private prisons in Oklahoma, and nearly 1 of every 5 Arizona inmates is currently in a contracted facility (ADC Daily Count Sheet, 9-16-2008). The development of sending inmates to private facilities is solely justified on cost effectiveness grounds, especially in terms of the savings the state realizes by not having to pay the upfront construction costs for capacity expansion. Private companies also tout their lower per capita costs, in comparison to state costs, although the data on which these claims are made in Arizona have been called into question (Pranis, 2005). The irony is that there is now a national market for prisoners as commodities for private facilities, so for a growing number of state inmates, there is no assurance that their confinement will even be in the same state, much less the same region, in which they were sentenced. Thus, private facilities in Arizona import prisoners from multiple states in the West, even as far away as Alaska and Hawaii, whereas the state of Arizona sends over 3,200 of their inmates all the way to Oklahoma despite the existence of thousands of private bed spaces within the state.

In the case of Arizona, this feature of the contemporary prison had the potential to go international several times in recent years. In 1997, Governor Fife Symington and then-Department of Corrections Director Terry Stewart devised a plan to move Mexican national prisoners out of the
state’s facilities and back to Mexico by contracting with a private prison company to build a prison across the border. The inmates would still be under the jurisdiction of Arizona and the state would be responsible for them through the private prison contract system, but the facility itself would be in Mexico. The governor argued that under NAFTA, such an arrangement should be feasible if both parties agreed to it.

The plan was touted in large part for its economic benefits, in that it would provide huge savings to the state, given the substantially reduced construction and labor costs in Mexico. Although the request for proposals issued by the Arizona state government yielded interest from one private prison firm from the United States, and one based in Mexico, the plan was ultimately abandoned due to the lack of an international treaty that would allow such an arrangement across national lines (see Fitzpatrick, 2004, for more on this). The idea was resurrected in 2005, when a Republican state legislator introduced a bill that aimed to get around the treaty problems with the earlier legislation. The bill passed both houses of the legislature, but Governor Napolitano vetoed it (Arizona Daily Star, 2005). Had such a plan been implemented, it had the potential to fully globalize and commoditize what was previously an exclusively state function that in its idealized form aimed to reform offenders and improve society.

**CONCLUSION**

Although, the ultimate determinations about where to site prisons and what kind of facilities will be built are inevitably the product of a contested and negotiated process – ideals get compromised, finances always constrain, micro-politics invariably play out in not always predictable ways – those mediated resolutions, taken together as a pattern of connected events, tell a powerful story about the meaning(s) of the prison in a given place over a period of time. In this case, that story suggests that the prisoner’s stake in such decisions has been consistently devalued, and the prison’s location and physical manifestation is more often a product of externally based factors that have little to do with penological ideals.

Micro-regional politics have been hugely influential in determining how prisons have been sited from 1876 onwards, and the planning and building of institutions has consistently reflected a broader political ethos about expecting punishment to be both tough and cheap, with inmates earning their keep as much as possible, except for during a brief period in the 1970s (see Lynch, 2009, for more on this). Thus, this case study of Arizona
suggests that rather than a major paradigm shift occurring in the late 20th century, breaking from a past that privileged rehabilitative rhetoric and practices, rehabilitation was itself the brief “break,” which was materially reflected in the design and construction of the urban facilities.

Specifically, in the conceptualization of the 1970s Tucson training facility, the physical incarnation of the institution was as important as the geographical place that it was built, and those two elements were both interdependent and connected to a larger social and penological mission. The facility would not realize its goals unless it was located in an urban space, and its placement in an urban space would be futile if not designed to take advantage of its location through the structure of the housing units, and therapeutic spaces, as well as through the tapping of expertise and familial ties in the surrounding community. Underlying this logic was a direct consideration of the needs of the residents, which shaped many of the design features and siting decisions. Although the decision to site the territorial prison in Florence 70 years earlier had prioritized potential work opportunities for inmates in the calculus, that emphasis was based on an economic goal than a reformative one. So the explicit concern with designing a holistically rehabilitative institution in the 1970s stands as an anomaly in this state’s history.

Concerns that new institutions be designed for the rehabilitative benefit of inmates, though, quickly slid in priority as the pressures of huge prisoner population growth reduced the scope of the prison’s purpose to a matter of bed space. The urban setting as a key priority was sustained for a few more years, yet even that geographic imperative lost value in the prison siting equation as the pressure increased to add beds to the system in the most economical and efficient manner possible, while following the path of least resistance.

As the prison transformed into an institution that need only contain prisoners, its location was no longer considered whatsoever in relation to the inmate’s needs. Rather, the political benefit of rewarding communities whose leaders wanted or “needed” a prison for economic development made the siting decisions easy. As municipal leaders offered up their locales for prison expansion, state political actors could gain points by complying with those requests, while avoiding the political costs of siting prisons where they were not wanted. The state also benefited economically from this course of action in that facilities could be designed to hold thousands of prisoners, and could be built quickly, often on discounted land.

In many ways, the politics of prison siting from the mid-1980s on had considerable congruence with the earliest siting decisions during territorial times. But the logic of the contemporary Arizona prison is not the identical
to that driving the Yuma and Florence prisons over 100 years ago. Those earlier facilities were conceived of and built explicitly to deal with offenders – certainly in a more punitive manner than others of their time, and with cost-effectiveness as a central goal – but the offender was still present as a consideration in the decision-making process. This was seen most clearly in the emphasis placed on the goal of full inmate employment, both in the decision to abandon Yuma and in selecting Florence as a site. In contrast, today’s facilities seem not to even have in mind the human aspects of those living bodies that are held within them as they are designed and built.

Instead, prisons have foremost become economic development opportunities in both the private and public sectors. The mere presence of prisoners’ bodies within city limits ensures annual state and federal revenue streams for prison towns, a benefit much more lucrative and tangible than the potential jobs and commerce promised by the prison industry. Beyond that, in the growing private prison sector, the offender has been reduced to a form of cost/commodity in a world where one can buy stock in companies that aim for institutional cost-effectiveness for their shareholders’ benefit (rather than for the state good), and where offenders themselves can be shipped all over the country to be confined by the lowest bidder.

Thus, the Arizona case both reinforces the insights derived from Gilmore’s (2007) California study about the tight relationship between the transforming post-industrial economy and prison expansion, and suggests that the longer historical view provides an understanding of the precursor conditions that allowed for the prison to become so divorced from an offender based purpose in the process. That the state’s investment in prison building was historically driven by economic and political considerations to the extent that it was provides something of a precedent for the contemporary period, and opened up the possibility of the kind of prison as industry model that we currently are witnessing. As such, this case study challenges some prevailing theoretical accounts that suggest the ideology underlying contemporary prisons represent a paradigmatic break from the past, and that a correctionalist ethos was hegemonic across the United States up until the 1970s (Garland, 2001).

NOTES
1. There were, in fact, plenty of escapes. The biennial reports from the prison indicated prisoner escapes during almost period, most (but not all) of whom were caught, returned to prison, and punished with the ball and chain and/or a stint in the “dungeon.” Several more were killed during capture.
2. By 1900, this experiment was functionally dead and the superintendent at the time asked permission to pull the plug on it. It turned out that the few acres that were usable were extremely difficult to irrigate during the “cropping season” and subject to flooding by the Colorado River in the spring (Brown, 1900).

3. One proposal was to place the prison in an area near the city’s mental hospital, county jail, and city dump, since in the prison committee’s view, this was the neighborhood where criminals came from. This proposal almost made it through since the legislator representing this area was a Democrat.

4. The legal issues were resolved when the state and the community reached an agreement about ultimate capacity limits at the site, which the state later violated.

5. Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio has claimed the tent city concept as his own innovation when he erected old military tents in Phoenix in 1993 for local inmates, but the state department of corrections predated his use of tents by a decade. See Lynch (2004, 2009), for more on Arpaio’s penal practices.

6. It should be noted that research indicates that prisons are not a particularly good economic remedy, especially to small, rural communities that seek them (see Gilmore, 2007; Huling, 2002; and King et al., 2003 for more on this).

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